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The Effect of Future Orientation on
the American Reformation of
English Judicial Method
By JAMES H. HARDISTY*
Introduction
Many lawyers disagree with the activist, quasi-political role as-
sumed by the American judiciary. The following questions formulate
the problem: Why have our judges taken an institution well designed
for adjudicating disputes between parties' and arrogated to it novel
functions in regulating society, for which it is poorly designed? Why
has the United States Supreme Court come to resemble a third house of
the United States legislature, becoming like the old English House of
Lords in being appointed from a powerful class2 for life by the execu-
tive and having a veto power over legislation passed by the people's
representatives?
The disparity between the judiciary's actual role and the role for
which it is best designed3 reflects underlying social phenomena. In the
* A.B., 1963, Harvard College, LL.B., 1966, Harvard Law School. Professor of Law,
University of Washington School of Law.
Many of the concepts in the first section of this Article were discussed in a graduate
student seminar in which the author participated at Harvard University in 1961. The semi-
nar, "Family Roles and Personality Development," was taught by Florence Kluckhohn and
John SpiegeL The seminar focused on the assimilation of American immigrants but did not
touch on either law or English value orientations.
The author thanks Richard Delgado and Elizabeth Hardisty for suggested changes in
this Article.
1. E.g., H.M. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 662-69 passim (1958) (mimeo-
graphed course materials published by Harvard Law School).
2. Lawyers are the natural American "aristocracy," possessing a privileged position in
governing American society. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMEmCA 282-90
(New York 1945) (1st ed. Paris 1835).
3. This Article grew out of the author's cognitive dissonance created by this disparity.
Although the author has been unsympathetic to many judicial method innovations, he has
become partially reconciled to these changes through this Article in envisioning them as
inevitable manifestations of underlying cultural values. Compare the observations in L.
JArqM, ENGLISH AND AMERwcAN JUDGES AS LAwMAKERS preface (1969) [hereinafter cited
as L. JAFE].
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United States, as elsewhere, members of a society share value assump-
tions that form the basic core of their culture.4 The society's institu-
tions, be they economic, political, social, religious, or legal, are shaped
by those basic value orientations. 5 Without discounting economic ex-
planations6 for the role assumed by the courts, this Article explores
more Platonic causes. It analyzes the American adoption-and trans-
formation--of traditional English judicial method by comparing differ-
ences between basic values in English and American cultures.
One fundamental value presupposition to be considered is that of
time. In general, Americans highly value the "future," and the English
value the "past."' 7 A primary thesis of this Article is that the manner in
which Americans have transformed traditional English judicial method
reflects the American prizing of the future and disparagement of the
past, compared to English valuings.
The first section of this Article describes a value orientation theory
that is applied in later sections. The second section examines how the
English doctrine of precedent manifests the strong English valuing of
the past. The third section discusses several American innovations in
judicial method and the way in which they reflect the American valu-
ing of the future. The fourth section contains a brief discussion of the
legal effect of other differences between English and American value
4. See, e.g., R. BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE (1934); E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD
AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1963); D. LEE, FREEDOM AND CULTURE (1959); B. MALINOWSKI, SEX
AND REPRESSION IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1927); M. MEAD, MALE AND FEMALE (1949); R.
REDFIELD, THE PRIMITIVE WORLD AND ITS TRANSFORMATIONS (1953); R. WHITE, LIVES IN
PROGRESS 12-14, 98-105 (3d ed. 1975); Edmonson, The Anthropology of Values, in CULTURE
AND LIFE 157 (1973); C. Kluckhohn, Values and Value Orientations in the Theory oAction,
in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION 388 (1951) [hereinafter cited as C. Kluckhohn].
Of course, in every society many individuals have deviant value assumptions. E.g., F.
KLUCKHOHN, & F. STRODTBECK, VARIATIONS IN VALUE ORIENTATIONS 24-28 (1961) [here-
inafter cited as F. KLUCKHOHN].
5. See, e.g., F. KLUCKHOHN, supra note 4, at 29; M. MEAD, SEX AND TEMPERAMENT
(1963). These institutions also shape the dominant basic values in any particular culture.
See, e.g., D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 61-83 (1963); F. KLUCKHOHN, supra note 4, at
29, 366-67; K. MARX & F. ENGELS, BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY (L.
Feuer ed. 1959); J. SPIEGEL, TRANSACTIONS xix-84 (1971).
"[A] Value-orientation may be defined as a generalized and organized conception, influ-
encing behavior, of nature, of man's place in it, of man's relation to man, and of the desira-
ble and nondesirable as they relate to man-environment and interhuman relations." C.
Kluckhohn, supra note 4, at 411.
6. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973); M. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977); K. MARX & F. ENGELS, BASIC
WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY (L. Feuer ed. 1959).
7. F. KLUCKHOHN, supra note 4, at 13-15, 351lassira; L. BARZINI, 0 AMERICA 189-90
(1977) (Americans highly value the future).
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orientations. Finally, the fifth section suggests some possible causes of
the dominant American time orientation and possible recent changes in
it.8
Value Orientations
Many anthropologists contend that understanding the basic values
of any culture is crucial to understanding behavior in that culture. 9
People often are unaware of their own value assumptions, perhaps be-
cause such assumptions widely and deeply permeate their culture and
seem obviously true.
An Overview of a Theory of Value Presuppositions
Florence Kluckhohn has developed one of the most insightful the-
ories of value presuppositions.10 According to her theory, cultures
must develop five value orientations: a "time orientation," an "activity
orientation," an orientation with xespect to the way people relate to
each other, an orientation as to good and evil as innate human charac-
teristics, and an orientation toward nature. I Each of these value orien-
tations is a response to a different basic problem of human life. For
each of these life problems, there is a range of solutions, as outlined in
8. A brief discussion of the novel aspects of this Article may be helpful to the reader.
To the best of the author's knowledge, no previous work has discussed, as a coherent whole
(or has even listed), the various American modifications of English judicial method or how
such modifications have reflected variations between English and American values. Simi-
larly, no earlier work known to the author has examined American and English judicial
processes as reflections of the basic values of those societies. Previous articles, however,
have contrasted certain aspects of American and English judicial methods, E.g., Goodhart,
Case Law in England and.tmerica, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 173 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Good-
hart]. This Article is premised, as is Goodhart's, on the rejection of the traditional, often
implicit, assumption that there is a single, common-law judicial method shared by both the
United Kingdom and the United States.
9. See, e.g., authorities cited note 4 supra.
10. See F. KLUCKHOHN, supra note 4, at 1-48 & especially I n.*. Her value-orienta-
tion theory is set forth here not because it has magically captured reality in its abstractions,
but because legal processes become more understandable when considered in the light of
such a theory than when considered in the absence of any explicit theory. Of course, many
other sociological, anthropological, or other basic value theories could have been presented
here to elucidate the legal phenomena. One reason for applying Florence Kluckhohn's the-
ory is that, unlike others, it was explicitly formulated to facilitate comparisons of different
cultures. F. Kluckhohn, Variations in Value Orientations as a Factor in Educational Planning,
in BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE FRONTIERS IN EDUCATION 293, 293 (1967).
Many of the ideas in this section of this Article are supported and elaborated upon in F.
KLucKHOHN, supra note 4, at 1-48 passim.
11. F. KLucKHoHN, supra note 4, at 10-20.
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the following table:12
"Value Orientation" "Range of Variations"
"Time" "Past" "Present" "Future"
"Activity" "Being" "Being-in- "Doing"
Becoming"
Human Relationships "Lineality" "Collaterality" "Individualism"
View of Humans "Evil" "Neutral" "Good-and-Evil" "Good"
Relationship to Nature "Subjugation- "Harmony-with- "Mastery-over-
to-Nature" Nature" Nature'
These five ranges of variations will be briefly summarized: (1) In
terms of "time," people have different assumptions about the extent to
which life is and should be controlled by the "past," focused on the
"present," or oriented to the "future"; (2) In the "activity" modality,
the alternative assumptions are that activity should be a "spontaneous
expression" of human nature ("being"), that it should "develop all as-
pects" of the actor as an integrated person ("being-in-becoming"), or
that it should accomplish some "external" goal ("doing"); 13 (3)
"Human relationships" may be viewed as (a) hierarchical with group
goals dominant and an emphasis on cultural continuity and "ordered
positional succession" ("lineality"), (b) as lateral with group goals still
dominant but with a primary concern also for the "goals and welfare of
[a] laterally extended group" somewhat independent of other groups
("collaterality"), or (c) as individualistic with individually determined
goals dominant over group goals ("individualism") 1 4 (4) Humans may
be viewed as inherently "evil," "good," a mixture of "good-and-evil,"
or neither good nor evil ("neutral"). Each of these characteristics in
turn may be viewed as mutable or fixed; 15 (5) In their orientation to-
ward the environment, people may see themselves as fatalistically
subordinated to the whims of nature ("subjugation-to-nature"), as an
inseparable part of nature ("harmony-with-nature"), or meant to domi-
nate and control the environment ("mastery-over-nature").' 6
In each culture there is a dominant ordering of the alternatives for
12. The table is a slight variation on the table appearing id at 12.
13. Id at 15-17.
14. Id at 17-20.
15. Id at 11-12.
16. Id at 13. There are also other basic life problems which every culture must face in
addition to those articulated by Kluckhohn. For example, each culture must concern itself
with the relative importance of things, people, and ideas, and each person in that culture
must have a value orientation ranking of their relative importance. On this scale, the pre-
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each value orientation. For example, according to Kluckhohn the typi-
cal middle-class American values future over present over past in time
orientation; doing over being over becoming in activity orientation; in-
dividualism over collaterality over lineality in relational orientation;
evil over good-and-evil over good in human nature orientation; and
mastery-over-nature over subjugation-to-nature over harmony-with-
nature in environmental orientation. 17 In each culture there are also
variant value-orientation patterns.' 8 For example, many Americans
have orientations of present over future over past and being over doing
over becoming. In contrast to Americans, the dominant English time
orientation has been past, rather than future, and the dominant rela-
tional orientation has been lineality, rather than individualism.' 9
American and English Time Orientations
This Article focuses mainly on the time orientation as a vehicle for
comparative analysis. Each individual has an evaluative orientation
toward the importance of the past, the present, and the future. A per-
son who is primarily focused on the past will follow tradition20 and
reminisce about the way things used to be. A person largely oriented to
the present focuses on what is occurring now, giving less thought to
tomorrow or yesterday and experiencing the world as a timeless place.
A person chiefly oriented to the future sees the world as a place that is
and should be improving, and feels that people should be preparing for
the future.
It is noteworthy for this Article's thesis that the typical middle-
dominant middle-class materialistic American ranking would be things over people over
ideas, at least as compared with other cultures.
17. Id at 11-32,258-83, 343, 351, 355-57; F. Kluckhohn, Some Refections on the Nature
of Cultural Integration and Change, in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, VALUES, AND SocIocuL-
TRuAL CHANGE 217, 237-38 (1963); F. Kluckhohn, Variations in Value Orientations as a
Factor in Educational Planning, in BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE FRONTIERS IN EDUCATION 293,
296-303, 306 (1967). Empirical studies have tended to confirm most of these rank orderings.
See F. KLUCICHOHN, supra note 4, at 351; J. PAPAJoHN & J. SPIEGEL, TRANSACtIONS IN
FAMILES (1975); McArthur, Personality Differences Between Middle and Upper Classes, 50 J.
ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 247 (1955); cf M. MEAD, AND KEEP YOuR POWDER DRY (ex-
panded ed. 1965) (an analysis of American culture from a different theoretical perspective);
Edwards, The Wrath of God, in I LIBRARY OF GREAT AMEICAN WarrING 90-95 (L. Unter-
meyer ed. 1960) (Puritans viewed man as inherently evil).
18. F. KLUCKHOHN, supra note 4, at 24-28.
19. Id at 14-15, 19.
20. Traditionalism reflects not only a strong past value orientation but also a high ]in-
eality value orientation, id at 32, with its component of cultural continuity through time.
Because Kluckhohn in part defines lineality in terms of continuity through time, there is
some theoretical difficulty in disentangling the lineality and pat orientations.
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class American not only ranks the future highest but also ranks the past
lowest. The future orientation of Americans is seen in their practice of
planning and preparing for the future.21 More than most other peoples,
Americans tend to undertake activities in order to have a better, or at
least a good, future. The American de-emphasis on the past is illus-
trated by the American readiness to reject the traditional ways as old
fashioned and the valuing of change as a good in itself.
22
In contrast, the English orientation to the past is manifested in the
retention of such political traditions as their King, their aristocracy,
and their House of Lords. Even as the substance of these political insti-
tutions has changed, the British have kept the form and ritual. This
preference for tradition may also be seen in the tendency of English
management and workers to work in the old (and sometimes ineffi-
cient) way. The traditional way of doing things has an importance in
England that seems foreign to many Americans. 23
Although it presents a useful framework, the Kluckhobn value ori-
entation theory need not be valid in all respects to support the analysis
undertaken here.24 Even if the American and English value rankings
are not those stated by Kluckhobn, the following proposition seems
clear. As between the two, the typical American is more future ori-
ented and the typical English person is more past oriented. Only this
proposition need be true to support the thesis of this Article. An alter-
native proposition, however, also supports this thesis. There is evi-
dence that American judges have tended to come from the middle
class, 25 and that, by comparison, English judges more often have up-
per-class origins.26 Observers of both American 27 and English28 socie-
21. Americans are often concerned with being on time, with using time efficiently, and
with clocks. Perhaps these phenomena in part reflect the dominant doing orientation of the
American middle class and the materialistic vision of man as thing, automaton, or machine.
22. C. Kluckhohn & F. Kluckhohn, American Culture. Generalized Orientations and
Class Patterns, in CONFLICTS OF POWER IN MODERN CULTURE 106, 116-17 (1947).
23. F. KLUCKHOHN, supra note 4, at 15.
24. For example, an empirical study showed that for a group of Texans the future
orientation was only greater than or equal to the present orientation. The past orientation
was a distant third. Id at 144-47, 258, 269-71,351. Such findings raise doubt about whether
future orientation actually is the dominant American time orientation. It should be noted,
however, that the study supported the assumption that among most Americans future orien-
tation is more dominant than past orientation.
25. See, e.g., J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT 30-62 (1960).
26. See, e.g., 1-5 J. CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND (new
& rev. ed. New York 1894-1899) (1st ed. London 1849-1857).
27. See, e.g., J. DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TowN 76-83 (3d ed.
1949); H. HODGES, SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 66 (1968); Hodges, Peninsula People: Social
Stratication in a Metropolitan Complex, in EDUCATION AND SOCIETY 389, 415 (1963); Mc-
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ties have concluded that the upper class or aristocracy in each society is
more past oriented than is the middle class. Thus, the proposition is
likely true that the predominantly middle-class American judiciary has
been more future oriented and less past oriented than the more upper-
class, English judiciary. Because judicial decisions are shaped in part
by judges' value assumptions, 29 this proposition also supports the thesis
of this Article.
English Past Orientation in the Doctrine of Precedent
The traditional English view of the operation of courts is past ori-
ented. After an adversary presentation, the court ascertains the facts
that occurred and the law in force when the facts arose and then applies
that old law to those old facts.30 Each of these steps is a retrospective,
past-oriented operation.
In ascertaining the law the focus is on the past determinations both
by the legislature that enacted the pertinent statutes and by predecessor
judges. English courts severly limited their overruling of judge-made
law.3 1 The best known instance is that the House of Lords formerly
prohibited itself from overturning its own decisions.32 All English
judge-made law is retroactive in application;33 that is, law made at time
X by judicial decision will be applied at time X + 1 by a future court to
a factual dispute that arose at time X - 1.
Yet, in ascertaining the law, traditional English courts did not hold
themselves out as laying down rules of law for the future.34 Judicial
opinions were oral.35 Each judge gave an individual opinion of what
Arthur, Personality Differences Between Middle and Upper Classes, 50 J. ABNORMAL & Soc.
PSYCH. 247 (1955).
28. See, eg., F. KLUCKHOHN, supra note 4, at 14; J. PAPAjoHm & J. SPIEGEL, TRANS-
ACTIONS IN FAMILIES 269 (1975).
29. See, e.g., H. SPAETH, AN INTRODUCTION TO SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING
(rev. ed. 1972).
30. More accurately, in any actual case each of the three steps is constantly repeated as
the court hones its legal solution. See generally H.M. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process
374-83 (1958) (mimeographed course materials published by Harvard Law School).
31. E.g., R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 103-51 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as R. CROSS].
32. See, e.g., id at 107-13, 133-35; Leach, Revisionisrm in the House of Lords: The Bas-
tion of Ri'id Stare Decisis Falls, 80 HARv. L. REv. 797, 797-98 (1967).
33. See, eg., R. CROSS, supra note 31, at 229-33; Friedland, Prospective and Retrospec-
ive Judicial Lawmaking, 24 U. TORONTO LJ. 170, 175-79 (1974).
34. See, eg., 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67 [1765]. But see, e.g., C. ALLEN,
LAW IN THE MAKING 190, 200-01 (7th ed. 1964).
35. See, ag., 12W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 102 (1938); 13 id 424-
25 (1952); 1 E. PLOWDEN, COMMENTARIES iii-vi (8th ed. London 1761) (1st ed. London
January 1979]
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the law was at the time of the dispute; there was no opinion of the
court.36 To have issued written opinions would have oriented the court
toward establishing rules for the future. The oral opinions, moreover,
were not recorded verbatim, 37 and sometimes not at all. Barristers and
judges often summarized them for private purposes, and these private
versions were later published,38 sometimes posthumously, 39 and then
venerated.
The English theory of stare decisis required that a court "stand by
earlier decisions" in the sense that it must reach the same result as an
earlier court upon a similar fact pattern. 4° The later court could not
"stand by earlier decisions" in the sense of following a rule of law an-
nounced by the earlier court: there was no opinion of the earlier court
setting forth rules from which the result followed. There were only seri-
atim oral opinions announcing different versions of the rules the vari-
ous judges applied to reach their result.
4'
Another English precedential rule, so past oriented that it strikes
Americans as bizarre, was that a court could not cite the writings of
living legal commentators, but only those of deceased commentators.42
It is also noteworthy that English law periodicals carry a much higher
1571) [hereinafter cited as E. PLOWDEN]. Some English decisions are now written opinions
of the court, particularly in the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal. See, e.g., Ex
parte Knight, [1976] 3 All E.R. 8, 9 (O.B. Div'1 Ct.); R. v. Belfon, [1976] 63 Crim. App. 59,
60.
36. See, e.g., Crosby, 95 Eng. Rep. 1005 (C.P. 1771).
37. See, e.g., 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 102 (1938); 13 id 424-
25 (1952); 1 E. PLOWDEN, supra note 35, at iv.
38. See, e.g., 1 E. PLOWDEN, supra note 35, at iv.
39. See, e.g., H. HOBART, REPORTS (unpaginated preface) (2d ed. London 1671) (1st
ed. London 1650).
40. E.g., Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161
(1930). More precisely Goodhart states: "The principle of the case is found by taking ac-
count (a) of the facts treated by the judge as material, and (b) his decision as based on
them." Id at 82. But see Montrose, The Language of, and a Notation for, the Doctrine of
Precedent, 2 U. WESTERN AuST. ANN. L. REV. 301 (1952).
41. In contrast to the British past-oriented system in which a judge is bound by past
precedents, French judges are more oriented to the present. French courts are more exclu-
sively oriented toward reaching an equitable resolution of the dispute before the court that is
consistent with current notions of what is fair and just. As they do not embrace the principle
of stare decisis, they are neither bound by previous judicial decisions nor bound to make
decisions that will bind future judges. E.g., R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW 179-88 (1972). To be
sure, France has a stronger precedential system than is often recognized but less strong than
the common-law method. See, e.g., id
42. See Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of Rigid Stare Decisis
Falls, 80 HARV. L. REv. 797, 801 (1967). This doctrine has been abandoned. Compare R. v.
Nowaz, [1976] 63 Crim. App. 178, 180 (citing Cross on Evidence) with R. CROSS, supra note
31.
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percentage of articles on the subject of precedent than do American
periodicals.43 The preoccupation with precedent indicates the past ori-
entation of the English legal community.
This English view of precedent is in accord with other past-ori-
ented, English visions. For example, Blackstone saw the common law
as composed of "maxims and customs" which were more ancient than
recorded history.44 Indeed, Blackstone even held that the "goodness"
of the common law depended on "its having been used time out of
mind," and this antiquity gave it "its weight and authority. '45 Accord-
ing to this Blackstonian formulation of common-law adjudication, the
judge in ascertaining the law need only find the custom that was al-
ready established.
In general, then, English judicial method was strikingly past ori-
ented at the time the common law was received in America. The En-
glish judicial system was consistent with other English institutions in
manifesting this strong value orientation of the typical English person.
Future Orientation in the Americanization of Common-Law
Method
American courts adopted and then modified most English prece-
dential practices. The resulting American precedential system reflects
the greater American concern with the future and less concern with the
past.
The American View Toward the Future
One important American innovation was the written opinion of
the court. The United States Supreme Court adopted this practice in
1801 under the guidance of Chief Justice Marshall.46 The practice al-
tered two English traditions. First, the tradition of appellate judges de-
livering separate opinions seriatim was replaced by the practice of
43. See the citations listed under the heading Precedents in INDEx OF LEGAL PERIODI-
cAts from 1926 to 1977.
44. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES *67 [1765].
45. 1d
46. This adoption is implied by William Cranch in the preface to volume I of his
United States Supreme Court reports (second edition), which is reprinted at 2 L. ED. preface
(2d ed. 1901). Seriatim opinions predominate for important United States Supreme Court
cases before 1801. See 2-4 U.S. (2-4 DalL) passimr (covering United States Supreme Court
cases from 1790-1800). In contrast, beginning in 1801 almost all United States Supreme
Court opinions are opinions by the Court. See 5-8 U.S. (1-4 Cranch) passim (covering
United States Supreme Court cases from 1801-1808); P. JACKSoN, DIssENT IN THE SUPREME
COURT 20-24 (1969).
January 19791 AMERICAN RFORMATION
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
issuing a single opinion of the court representing the prevailing view of
all judges joining the opinion. Second, the tradition of oral opinions
was replaced by the practice of reporting opinions written by the judges
themselves. Formerly, a judge's oral opinion, indeed, the entire case,
might or might not be reported later. Even if it were, the private re-
porter would only more or less paraphrase parts of what each judge
had said.47 By delivering written opinions, American appellate judges
gained more control over future decisions, for they alone determined
the exact language that would influence later judges, especially lower-
court judges, and, thus, private parties. The practice of issuing a single
opinion of the court, moreover, made it more practicable for judges to
reshape the law with an eye to the future. If a court gives only one
opinion, it is possible to formulate precisely the rule that the court ex-
pects itself and lower courts to follow in the future. In contrast, under
the old English system of seriatim oral opinions, it was more difficult to
announce a new rule or to give a new direction to an old rule. Any
such rule would be "announced" in several opinions; it was uncertain
whether those opinions would be reported or, if they were, what words
the reporter would use to state the rule. The innovation of the written
opinion of the court spread throughout the appellate courts of future-
oriented America.48
American courts further altered English methods by giving less
weight to precedent than English courts.49 In particular, American
judges have become much more likely to overrule earlier cases than
English judges.
50
American courts have also reached more strongly toward the fu-
ture than English courts by emphasizing a meaning of "stare decisis"
that lends itself to controlling the future. "Stare decisis" literally means
"to stand by decisions." American courts implicitly have tended to de-
fine the word "decisis" less often to mean standing by the earlier
judgment and more often standing by the announced rule.
As noted above, the traditional English principle of stare decisis
required a judge to arrive at a result5' consistent with an earlier court's
47. See, e.g., authorities cited note 37 supra.
48. See, e.g., I N.H. preface passim (1819).
49. L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 59 passim; Goodhart, supra note 8, at 174-93. Contra, G.
GILMoRE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 10-11 (1977).
50. Goodhart, supra note 8, at 179-8 1. Compare Stoffer, The Work of the Judicial Sys-
tem: 1953-1954, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1954) and Wilson, Stare Decisi, Quo Vadis? The
Orphaned Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 33 GEo. L.J. 251 (1945) with 92 L.Q. REv. 321,
321-23 (1976).
51. In this Article, "result" means judgment for plaintiff or defendant.
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disposition, given the material facts in the earlier case.5 2 The later
judge did not need to follow a rule of law explicitly laid down in the
earlier case. Indeed, no rules could have been definitively laid down
by the earlier court in view of the English practice of seriatim oral
opinions. In contrast, American courts frequently have assumed that
stare decisis pushes them toward standing by the rules that an earlier
court set forth and applied in reaching its judgment.
5 3
For example, in Miranda v. Arizona,54 the Supreme Court promul-
gated these now-familiar rules to guide future action by police and
courts: "Prior to any [custodial] questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed," and that in-
custody statements obtained in response to questioning in the absence
of such warnings may not be introduced into evidence by a prosecu-
tor.5 5 The Court did not expect lower courts to examine the facts of the
four companion cases in Miranda. Nor did it expect them to dismiss
the Miranda rules as mere dicta while formulating other rules, consis-
tent with the Miranda results, that admit confessions that would have
been excluded under the Miranda rules.56 Rather, the Court desired
that lower courts adhere to the announced rules in all future cases.
This goal was understood and, indeed, lower courts57 and the Supreme
Court itselTf3 have stood by most of the rules promulgated in Miranda.
Wyman v. Wallace59 is a recent example of a similar phenomenon
in the common law. In Wyman, the Washington Court of Appeals ex-
52. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930); see
Cross, The Ratio: Decidendi and a Pluraliy of Speeches in the House ofLords, 93 L.Q. REv.
378, 378-79, (1977). But see R. CROSS, supra note 31, at 76, 103-06; Oliphant, A Return to
Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 71-75 (1928).
53. See, e.g., 1 N.H. preface (1819). For an insightful article pertinent to these different
meanings of stare decisis, see Montrose, The Language of, and a Notationfor, the Doctrine of
Precedent, 2 U. WESTERN AusT. ANN. L. REv. 301 (1952).
54. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
55. Id at 444.
56. E.g., a rule admitting a confession when police had given a defendant all of the
Miranda warnings except the caution that any statement "may be used as evidence against
him." Id Inasmuch as none of the Miranda cases involved this fact pattern, such a formula-
tion would be consistent with the Miranda results but not its rules.
57. See, eg., Washington v. Estelle, 525 F.2d 1213, 1214 (5th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354, 356-57 (7th Cir. 1970).
58. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
(1968). But see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971).
59. 15 Wash. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71 (1976), petitionfor review granted, 88 Wash. 2d
1010 (1977).
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plicitly abolished the tort action of alienation of affections. The court
did not mention any facts occurring in the case. Thus, there is no way a
later trial court could follow Wyman by standing by its material facts
and result. Instead, a court must stand by the announced rule abolish-
ing the alienation of affections action.
Perhaps this American shift toward announced rules of law is most
pronounced in the American innovation of the prospective holding.
Under the most common form of that doctrine, a newly promulgated
court rule is applied to the case before the court and to fact patterns
arising after the rule's announcement, but not to unadjudicated facts
occurring before the promulgation.60
A court employs a prospective overruling or other prospective
holding to establish a new rule for the future without upsetting actions
taken in reliance on the old rule. By generally limiting the effect of the
new rule to the future, courts become freer to make new laws. Such a
future-oriented role for the courts has not found acceptance with the
tradition-oriented English, who have failed to embrace the American
practice of prospective overruling.61
Policy Factors in American Courts
In giving lesser weight to past decisions than English courts,
American courts necessarily give more weight to other factors. In par-
ticular, American courts rely more than English courts upon a policy
view of what the law should be in the future. This emphasis on policy
factors has reoriented American law away from traditional English
analysis of old cases, principles, and rules and toward a futuristic anal-
ysis of the social consequences that will follow from a particular deci-
sion. This American shift from precedential to policy analysis is
reflected not only in American judicial opinions, but also in American
law school class discussions and law reviews. These three verbal vehi-
cles will be explored in turn.
Horwitz plausibly contends that American judges shifted toward
this "instrumental conception of law"'62 shortly after the Revolutionary
War. At this time, they began to break with English tradition by con-
60. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
61. See, e.g, R. CRoss, supra note 31. However, the House of Lords in a sense pro-
spectively overruled earlier cases when it issued a four paragraph "Practice Statement (Judi-
cial Precedent)," which was unrelated to any pending case. 1 W.L.R. 1234 (1966). This
Practice Statement announced that the House of Lords was abandoning its practice of not
overruling its own earlier decisions. Id
62. M. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 1 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as M. Hogwrrz].
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sciously viewing themselves more as makers of law for the future and
less as "derivers" of law from previous authorities. 63 From this new
judicial self-image as lawmakers followed naturally a judicial concern
with the consequences of the rules that they were making.64 After a
retreat from policy analysis during the "Formal Style" period of the
late nineteenth century,65 American judicial opinions have become ev-
ermore preoccupied with policy factors as the twentieth century has
progressed.
66
Similarly, American law school classes have shifted away from the
English model of a transmission of settled law by lecture toward class
discussion of what the law should be. The Socratic method of teaching,
in which the teacher asks students to articulate the assumptions behind
rules of law and the assumptions behind assumptions, develops lawyers
more as policymakers and lawmakers than as mere law appliers.67
The establishment of law reviews at most American law schools
also reflects an orientation toward evaluating and shaping the future
direction of the law. This orientation is especially manifest in current
law reviews. A trend toward greater policy discussion in law review
notes has continued throughout the twentieth century, and the modern
reader is struck by the meagerness of policy discussion in the typical,
turn-of-the-century student note.68
63. Id at 1-30; cf. K. LLEWELLYN, TIE COMMON LAW TRADITION 37 (1960) (the
"Grand Style" ofjudicial lawmaking was dominant from 1820 to 1860); White, The Path of
American Jurisprudence, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1212, 1223-24, 1239, 1241 (1976) (the American
judiciary was quite innovative in the early nineteenth century). Contra, R. BRIDWELL & R.
WHrrrEN, THE CONSTUTION AND THE COMMON LAW xiv passim (1977). See generaly
Ely, Book Review, 53 IND. L.J. 277 (1978). To be sure, judges inevitably made new law and
used law instrumentally even when they did not have the self-image of doing so. See, eg.,
K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930); 3. HALL, TfHEFT, LAW AND SocmTY (2d ed.
1952). However, judges will make new law in a greater percentage of cases when they see
themselves in the new role of policymakers and perceive following the old law as impossible
or undesirable than when they see themselves in the old role of the finders of the law that is
already established. Cf. W. PROBERT, LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 4-22 (1972)
(the legal realists had considerable rhetorical and political impact).
64. M. HoRwITz, supra note 62, at 2 passim.
65. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADnIoN 35-45 (1960). Butsee 0. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 78 (1881).
66. See, eg., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
67. The impact of legal education on American and English judicial method is dis-
cussed in Goodhart, supra note 8, at 189-91, and L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 105-13. See
generaly Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDuc.
247 (1978).
68. See, eag, 15 HARv. L. REv. 64 (1901); 14 HARv. L. REv. 144 (1900); 18 YALE L.J.
123, 123-28 (1908); 18 YALE L.J. 133 (1908). But see 15 HARv. L. RIv. 147 (1901). The
influence of law reviews on American judicial method is examined in L. JA E, supra note 3,
at 106-07.
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This increased concern with policy factors has been much truer of
American jurists than of English ones. It reflects the predominant
American concern with the future. A consideration of the social conse-
quences of adopting one rule as opposed to another shows a concern
for the future effects of the competing rules. The British are chary of
such emphasis on future-oriented policy considerations.
69
A closely related American development is the emphasis on pur-
posive analysis as a method of construing statutes and other legal rules.
Under the theory of purposive analysis, a judge should construe a stat-
ute or rule in a way that furthers the purposes it was designed to
achieve or should achieve.70 Such a goal-oriented or future-oriented
method of reading statutes is less prevalent with the Engl sh. In con-
trast, they tend to emphasize the normal meaning of words and normal
grammatical constructions in interpreting statutes.7 1 Even the tradi-
tional English method of construing statutes in light of the mischief at
which they were aimed 72 has a backward-looking orientation, as the
mischief preceded the statute.
The Legislative Role of the Courts
Taken together, these changes have produced a new American vi-
sion of the function of appellate courts. In England there was a sharp
69. See, e.g., Woolmington v. D.P.P., [1935] A.C. 462; Edwards, Automatism and Crimi-
nalResponsibility, 21 MOD. L. REv. 375 (1958); Marshall, Interpretation by a Superior Court,
90 L.Q. REv. 170 (1974). Perhaps the British judge who was most notoriously policy ori-
ented was William Murray, the first Earl of Mansfield, who was chief justice of the King's
Bench court from 1756 to 1788. See, e.g., Llewellyn, Mansield, WilliamA Murray, 1st Earl of,
11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 460 (15th ed. 1974); M. HoRwITz, supra note 62, at 18.
Mansfield reformed the ancient English law to make it more suitable for industrial society.
Llewellyn, supra, at 460. But note that this un-English judicial task of promulgating laws for
the future was left by the English to a Scotsman, Mansfield. Id The Scottish may well be
more future oriented than the English. It is noteworthy that apparently the only time that
the traditional English courts delivered their result by one opinion of the court, rather than
by seriatim opinions of each judge, was when Mansfield was chief justice of the King's
Bench. P. JACKSON, DIssENT IN THE SUPREME COURT 23 (1969). As discussed above, the
single opinion allows the court to more easily shape rules for the future.
70. See, e.g., H.M. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 1200, 1410-17, 162-168 (1958)
(mimeographed course materials published by Harvard Law School); In re Estates of Don-
nelly, 81 Wash. 2d 430, 502 P.2d 1163 (1972).
71. See, e.g., Elkan, Brie/Legislation-Lengthy Litigation, 125 NEw L.J. 465 (1975);
Marshall, Interpretation by a Superior Court, 90 L.Q. Rnv. 170 (1974). The English position
may be changing toward more purposive analysis. See, e.g., Marsh, Interpretation of
Statutes, 9 J. Soc. Put. T.L. 416 (1967); Editorial, Continental Practice and English Law, 4
ANGLo-AM. L. REv. 360 (1975).
72. See, e.g., Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584); Assam Rys. & Trading Co.
v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [1935] A.C. 445 (1934).
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distinction between the legislature, which prospectively laid down fu-
ture rules, and courts, which retroactively adjudicated disputes by de-
termining what past rules had been in existence at the time the dispute
arose. Parliament was a forward-looking institution, and the courts
were backward-looking ones.
Their future orientation has changed Americans' vision of the
courts' function away from institutions for determining what rule ex-
isted at the time of a dispute and toward institutions for laying down
rules soundly to guide the future.73 This change toward "judicial activ-
ism" has been widely commented on and is seen at both the appellate
and trial court levels.74 The United States Supreme Court has in-
creased its capacity to be a future-oriented instrument of reform by
such innovations as approving the declaratory-judgment action, re-
laxing requirements for standing to sue and to raise constitutional
questions, creating the category for statutes of "unconstitutional on its
face," and broadening class actions.75 All of these changes ha've made
it easier for the Supreme Court to make new law for the future in a
quasi-legislative manner.
The change in our vision of the function of federal trial courts has
been especially marked in public-law litigation.76 In such litigation
there has been a shift from judicial relief by money compensation for
past wrongs to relief by injunction or other forward-lookinig techniques
that require the court continuously to remain involved in solving a so-
cial problem.77 Similarly, in such public-law litigation, fact inquiries
have shifted from determining what happened between two parties in
the past (adjudicative facts) toward determining the consequences for
many persons in the future if the court issues one or another order or
rule (legislative facts).78
The American future orientation, thus, has resulted in a gradual
73. The constitutional function of American courts also has contributed to this changed
vision. In addition, national courts in a federal system, such- as the United States Supreme
Court, may be pressured toward a future-oriented role in order to control state court
decisions.
74. See, eg., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1281 (1976); Cox, he New Dimensions of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 51 WASH. L. REV. 791
(1976).
75. See Cox, The New Dimensions of Constitutional Adjudication, 51 WAH. L. REv.
791, 802-13 (1976).
76. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281
(1976).
77. Id at 1298-1302.
78. Id at 1296-98, 1302.
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blurring of the traditional English distinction between the functions of
courts and the legislature.
The Legal Impact of Other American Value Orientations
This Article so far has examined the effects of dissimilarities be-
tween the English and American time orientations. This section dis-
cusses the effects on legal method of English and American differences
in other value orientations. The discussion will be illustrative rather
than exhaustive. The section will conclude by considering one example
of how English-American variations may be seen in the American
modification of English substantive law.
Effects of Other Value Orientations on Previously Discussed Judicial
Practices
Aside from time, Kluckhohn set forth only one other orienta-
tion-that of human relationships-in which the English and Ameri-
can patterns differed. Individualism dominates American human
relationships, while lineality dominates English ones.79 Kluckhohn's
theory of value orientations specifies that most institutions in a society
reflect all of the society's value orientations, rather than just a single
one.80 Many of the English-American judicial differences described
above, therefore, should reflect cultural differences in both the time
and human relationships orientations.
These reflections are evident. The weakening of stare decisis and
other aspects of American judicial activism outlined above reflect the
shift from English lineality to American individualism. Because "cul-
tural continuity"8' is an important part of lineality, the strong English
lineality orientation supports stare decisis. In contrast, a core notion of
individualism is that individuals predominantly determine their own
goals. A decision against following precedent is a decision against the
goals, values, and rules of others and a substitution of rules based on
the judge's own values. Thus, a judge making new law manifests indi-
vidualism more strongly than one who conserves the received law.
The three remaining value orientations are activity, relationship to
nature, and human nature. As previously indicated, the dominant
American pattern gives highest ranking to doing (in the activity orien-
79. See F. KLUCKHOHN, supra note 4, at 19.
80. F. Kluckhohn, Variations in Value Orientations as a Factor in Educational Planning,
in BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE FRONTIERS IN EDUCATION 293, 304-05 (1967).
81. Id at 303.
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tation), mastery-over-nature (relationship to nature), and evil (human
nature). 2 These three values are also emphasized in English culture,
but somewhat less than in American culture, and therefore the Ameri-
can judicial process should reflect not only stronger future and individ-
ualism orientations, but to some degree stronger doing, mastery-over-
nature, and evil orientations.
For example, the movement of American judges toward judicial
activism is compatible with a strong doing orientation and its associ-
ated concern with accomplishment. The doing-oriented judge will be a
judicial activist who wants to do something about a problem and will
see law as an instrument for solving it. The American mastery-over-
nature orientation is also manifested in the American instrumental
view of law. More than most other peoples, Americans design laws to
achieve purposes. Americans are future-oriented social engineers who
believe that men manipulate the laws and the laws manipulate the en-
vironment.83 It seems doubtful that the previously discussed, American
legal-method innovations reflect a view of man as basically evil, al-
though it could be argued that active judges are more needed to control
the naturally evil than the naturally good.
Other Legal-Method Effects of Value Differences
Other American changes in English legal method reflect variations
between English and American values. For example, the greater
American emphasis on common-law and constitutional judicial law-
making shows the shift to American individualism. This emphasis on
lawmaking by adjudication rather than by legislation reflects a high
valuing of autonomously chosen individual goals. The adjudicative
process is generally initiated by individuals seeking individually chosen
goals. In addition, the adversary method of presenting evidence and
arguments focuses the lawmaker's concern on the plight and interests
of individuals more than does the group-oriented legislative process.
Because the judicial forum is individual oriented, it is only natural that
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation first developed in
the United States.84 In contrast, British judges lack the power to over-
82. See authorities cited note 17 uMlpra.
83. Some Americans may have a "man-over-man" orientation as a subset of their man-
over-nature orientation insofar as they see other people as part of the environment they
manipulate. This manipulative orientation toward other persons may be manifested in an
instrumental conception of law.
84. M. CAPPELEM, JuDICIAL REvw IN THE CoNTEMoRA.Y WORLD 25 (1971) (ju-
dicial review was first instituted in the United States). The American innovation ofjudicial
review of the constitutionality of legislation reflects not only American individualism, but
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turn the enactments of Parliament.
Nevertheless, there appears to be a conflict between the American
orientations toward individualism, on the one hand, and the future on
the other. The relative importance given to adjudication in America is
consistent with its individualism, as just discussed. It was earlier
demonstrated, however, that adjudicating is more past oriented than
legislating, raising a conflict with the dominant American orientation
toward the future. The resolution of this conflict is explained by the
finding that individualism is a much more dominant American value
orientation than is future orientation.85 Where the two conflict, indi-
vidualism predominates. Thus, adjudicative lawmaking triumphs, but
with a twist: the lawmaking contains a strong future orientation mani-
fested in judicial decisions aimed at guiding the future.
American individualism is also expressed in the way that the tradi-
tional "officer of the court" aspect of the lawyer's role in England has
been de-emphasized in America. The typical American lawyer seeks,
more exclusively than the English lawyer, the desires of the client, even
when those wants oppose the interests of the court and society.8 6 This
Americanism reflects the replacement of the authority orientation im-
plicit in English lineality with the individual orientation implicit in
American individualism. This great reliance on the adversary method
in American law also reflects the emphasis on competition inherent in
the doing orientation.
American Changes in Substantive Law
American value orientations have influenced not only its legal
method but also its substantive law. Consider one example pertaining
to the concept and rules of property law. Horwitz presents evidence of
a transformation that occurred in the conception of property from the
"static agrarian [eighteenth century] conception entitling an owner to
undisturbed enjoyment to a dynamic, instrumental and more abstract
[nineteenth century] view of property that emphasized. . . productive
also the American vision of man as basically evil. This vision is also reflected in other
aspects of the American system of checks and balances, including the jury as a check on evil
governmental officials. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
85. See, e.g., J. PAPAJOHN & J. SPIEGEL, TRANSACTIONS IN FAMILIES 35-36, 49-50
(1975); F. KLUCKHOHN, supra note 4, at 145.
86. This contrast is based primarily on personal observation. In addition, compare
Orkin, Defense of One Known to be Guilty, 1 CRIM. L.Q. 170 (1958) with Freedman, Profes-
sional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: the Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH
L. REV.1469 (1966).
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use and development. T87 This transformation is more understandable
when seen in part as a change from English past orientation to Ameri-
can future orientation. The English viewed property as prescriptive
rights granted in the past, with conflicting uses being resolved in favor
of the most long-established use. That view was replaced by an Ameri-
can conception of property more oriented to future productive develop-
ment. This new American conception also reflects the American doing
value in its orientation toward economic development. Similarly, it re-
flects American individualism by allowing more individual autonomy
in land use rather than following the lineality notion of cultural con-
tinuity implicit in the English pattern of giving priority to the "natural
use"88 of land. Moreover, not only the future, doing, and individual-
ism orientations but also the mastery-over-nature orientation may be
seen in the example of the American granting of legal priority to water
mills in place of the former English priority for the "natural use" of
land.
89
It would be beyond the scope of this Article to analyze further the
impact of English-American value differences on the substantive law.
Such an analysis, in fact, probably should await further explanation of
when American value orientations took their present form. This dis-
cussion has proceeded on the assumption that such value formations
occurred in the late eighteenth century, an assumption supported by
the studies summarized by Clyde Kluckhohn.90 A part of the historical
analysis would be a study of the causes of particular value orientation
patterns. As a step in that direction, the next section offers some con-
jectures on the origins of the dominant American time-orientation
pattern.
Observations as to the Origin and Recent Trends of American
Time Orientation
Four of the historical factors that may account for Americans'
high value of the future and low value of the past are discussed here.
The first is the nature of immigrants. Persons who valued the future
highly and the past slightly were more likely than others to have up-
rooted themselves from the old country and its traditions for the move
87. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 62, at 31.
88. Id
89. Id
90. C. Kluckhohn, Have There Been Discernible Shifts in American Values During the
Past Generation?, in THE AmERiCAN STYLE 145, 149, 152 (E. Morison ed. 1958).
January 1979] AMERICAN REFORMATION
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
to the New World.91 Similarly, the advantages of moving to a new
country accrue in the future at a sacrifice of present comforts and
money. Thus, immigrants were likely to be more future oriented than
persons who chose to stay at home and retain present values. Because
children tend to have the same values as their parents, 92 the future
value orientation of immigrants tended to be shared by their
descendants.
Second, there was a strong element of Puritanism among many
American immigrants. The Puritan concern with eternal damnation or
reward is an orientation to the future, involving present sacrifices for
future rewards.
Third, once immigrants arrived in America they found themselves
cut off from the traditions of the old country. They were, thus, some-
what unable to follow the ways of the past even to the extent of their
past orientation. They also faced great change in their lives. To a con-
siderable degree, what people value tends to follow what they actually
experience.93 Thus, immigrants, cut off from their past and experienc-
ing change, would tend to value their past less and value change more,
becoming less past oriented and more future oriented.
Fourth, modem industrial society may well cause people to be-
come more future oriented. To some extent any economic system
shapes people into the kinds of creatures needed to make that system
work effectively.94 Our complex industrial system involves more plan-
ning and change, such as in the development of new products, than did
traditional agricultural life. American culture is more shaped by the
needs of industrial society than other cultures, for it has been primarily
formed during the industrial age. Most other cultures, to the contrary,
were principally shaped during the agricultural age.
The preceding examination of the origins of the dominant Ameri-
can time orientation ranking is a suggestive exploration rather than an
exhaustive analysis. 95 In a similar vein are the following comments on
91. Although there was a smaller transition for English immigrants to America than
other immigrants, after the American Revolution the English faced large political as well as
social changes in immigrating.
92. See, e.g., B. BERELSON & G. STEINER, HUMAN BEHAVIOR 562-63 (1964); G.
FISHER, RELATIONSHIPS IN ATrITUDES, OPINIONS AND VALUES AMONG FAMILY MEMBERS
(1948); J. PAPAJOHN & J. SPEIGEL, TRANSACTIONS IN FAMILIES (1975).
93. Personal observation. For similar observations, see R. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY
110 & n.27 (1959).
94. See, e.g., D. RiESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD 19-48 (Doubleday ed. 1953).
95. In C. Kluckhohn & F. Kluckhohn, American Culture: Generalized Orientations and
Class Patterns, in CONFLICTS OF POWER IN MODERN CULTURE 106, 116-117 (1947), the
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the recent shift, especially among young Americans, away from future
orientation toward present orientation.96 Many are now more con-
cerned with enjoying and experiencing the present than with what may
happen in the future.
97
Taken together the recently increased judicial inclination to do eq-
uity on the facts before the court and the decreased orientation toward
legal rules98 manifest this trend toward present orientation. Adjudica-
tion based on legal rules is most consistent with a future orientation,
somewhat consistent with a past orientation, and least consistent with a
present orientation. The adjudicative activities of making rules and
following rules should be analyzed separately. Because rules are made
to affect the future, rule making is quintessentially a future-oriented
activity. The following of a previously established rule is past oriented
in the sense that it involves conformity to that which has been deter-
mined in the past. It, however, also is future oriented in the sense that
by following the rule-such as by leaving passengers in the station
when the train promptly leaves on time, or by letting the terrorists
shoot the hostages rather than let convicts go free99-- the rule follower
incurs a present harm but gains a hoped-for future benefit. In sum-
mary, there appears to have been a recent American trend toward pres-
ent orientation, and this has been reflected in the movement of the
legal system away from rules. This trend will likely continue. 100
authors state that the American belief in "Change [as] a Value in Itself" is due to the en-
trenchment of "the nineteenth century faith in 'progress.' "
96. Similar observations are recorded in F. Kluckhohn, Some Reflections on the Nature
of Cultural Integration and Change, in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, VALUES AND SOCIOCUL-
TURAL CHANGE 217,238 & n.25 (1963); J. PAPAjoHN & J. SPIEGEL, TRANSACTIONS IN FAMI-
LIES 275 (1975).
97. See, e.g., C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970).
98. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1685 (1976); Powers, Formalism and Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 WASH.
L. REv. 27 (1976).
99. The train and hostage examples are from Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1698, 1701 (1976).
100. The trend toward present orientation may in part be caused by the fact that more
and more generations now separate average middle-class Americans from their future-ori-
ented, ancestral immigrants. In addition, some argue that our capitalist economy has shifted
from needing more future-oriented, high-saving producers to needing more present-ori-
ented, high-spending consumers. Moreover, the dominant present orientation of Spanish-
American culture, F. KLUCKHOHN, supra note 4, at 174,256, and black American culture, J.
PAPAJOHN & J. SPIEGEL, TRANSACTIONS IN FAMILIES 279 (1975), have influenced the white,
middle-class American culture toward greater present orientation as these minority cultures
have become increasingly influential. All three of these factors point toward a continuing
increase in American present orientation. On the other hand, the increasing tempo of
change in American society, A. TOFFLER , FUrURE SHOCK (1970), points toward a greater
future orientation.
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Conclusion
Law manifests basic cultural values. Value assumptions shared by
the members of a society inevitably are reflected by the society's insti-
tutions. Using a comparative-law approach, this Article has examined
the way in which dissimilarities between American and English legal
methods reflect basic value differences. Orientations toward the future,
individualism, doing, mastery-over-nature, and evil are all stronger
among Americans than among the English. These value differences
have been manifested in the way the American judiciary has altered
judicial methods received from the English. Particular examples of
American judicial method innovations are a court's single written opin-
ion, the rule concept of stare decisis, prospective holdings, an instru-
mental conception of law, purposive analysis, constitutional judicial
review, and judicial activism generally. Each of these becomes more
understandable when seen as a manifestation of differences between
English and American values.
